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PENDEKATAN PERANGKAAN KE ARAH PENGESANAN CECACING 
MENGGUNAKAN TEKNIK HUBUNG SILANG 
ABSTRAK 
 
Rangkaian komputer telah menjadi satu dimensi penting bagi organisasi 
moden. Oleh itu, bagi memastikan rangkaian dijalankan pada prestasi tinggi 
(penggunaan rangkaian dan kelajuan biasa tanpa sebarang kesilapan) dianggap 
sebagai satu langkah penting bagi pertubuhan-pertubuhan ini. Untuk mencapai 
matlamat ini, rangkaian perlu selamat kerana keselamatan merupakan salah satu isu 
yang penting untuk mencapai tahap prestasi yang baik (tiada kesilapan dalam 
rangkaian seperti kegagalan sambungan pada kadar yang tinggi). Walau 
bagaimanapun, tugas ini adalah hampir mustahil terutamanya apabila terdapat isu-isu 
lain yang perlu ditangani. Tesis ini member penekanan pada pengesanan kehadiran 
rangkaian cecacing dalam rangkaian, yang merupakan salah satu masalah yang 
paling mencabar dalam keselamatan rangkaian. Dengan mengesan kehadiran 
rangkaian cecacing dalam rangkaian, sumber dan perkhidmatan boleh segera 
dilindungi dengan langkah-langkah keselamatan patching atau memasang, seperti 
firewall, sistem pengecaman pencerobohan atau sistem komputer alternatif. 
 
Pendekatan yang sedia ada untuk pengesanan cecacing rangkaian dan 
pendekatan berasaskan perilaku terutamanya tidak cukup tepat untuk melakukan 
pengesanan cecacing rangkaian berdasarkan heuristik mudah dan pendekatan yang 
kurang berkesan untuk mengesan simptom rangkaian. Tujuan kajian tesis ini ialah 
untuk mencadangkan dan melaksanakan sebuah pendekatan yang mengesan 
kewujudan rangkaian cecacing dalam rangkaian. 
xvi 
 
Pendekatan yang dicadangkan dikenali sebagai Pendekatan Perangkaan ke 
Arah Pengecaman Cecacing Rangkaian menggunakan Teknik Hubung Silang 
(ASAWDCRT), terdiri daripada tiga sub algoritma  iaitu: Rangkaian Pengimbas, 
Rangkaian Korelasi Cecacing dan Rangkaian Cecacing Tandatangan Automasi. 
Pendekatan rangkaian pengimbas terdiri daripada tiga modul yang kecil; (i) Modul 
Penapis (ii) Modul Penganalisis Trafik Statistik dan (iii) Modul Hubung Silang. 
Pendekatan Rangkaian Korelasi Cecacing, yang bertujuan untuk sumber destinasi 
mengesan korelasi perilaku untuk rangkaian cecacing dan terdiri daripada dua modul 
yang kecil; iaitu, (i) Modul pelabuhan destinasi korelasi berasaskan pengecaman 
cecacing rangkaian, (ii) Modul Amaran; dan (3) Pendekatan pengenalan rangkaian 
cecacing automasi tandatangan yang bertujuan untuk menjana pengenalan perilaku 
untuk gejala cecacing rangkaian (imbasan dan korelasi sumber destinasi). 
 
Algoritma rangkaian imbasan adalah berdasarkan penggunaan paket TCP RST 
untuk mengesan imbasan berturutan TCP dan paket ICMP jenis ketiga ( port yang 
tidak dapat dihubungi) untuk mengesan imbasan berturutan UDP. Imbasan rawak 
TCP disahkan apabila terdapat hubung silang antara ICMP jenis ketiga, kod 1 (port 
yang tidak dapat dihubungi) dan TCP RST. Imbasan rawak UDP disahkan apabila 
terdapat hubung silang antara ICMP jenis ketiga, kod 3 (port yang tidak dapat 
dihubungi) dan ICMP jenis ketiga, kod 1 (port yang tidak dapat dihubungi).  
 
Dengan menggunakan ASAWDCRT, signifikasi keuntungan penindasan ialah 
94.75% dari segi pengesanan ketepatan bagi pengesanan cecacing TCP dan 99.9% 
dari segi pengesanan ketepatan bagi pengesanan ketepatan UDP berbanding dengan 
skema pengesanan cecacing yang sedia ada. Sementara itu, algoritma imbasan diuji 
xvii 
 
dengan set data DARPA 1998 dan NAv6 dan disahkan algoritma imbasan adalah 
lebih cekap dan mengesan imbasan TCP dan UDP berbanding algoritma sedia ada 
dan juga menyediakan ketepatan pengesanan yang lebih baik dengan ketepatan 
purata 66.6%. 
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A STATISTICAL APPROACH TOWARDS WORM DETECTION USING 
CROSS-RELATION TECHNIQUE   
ABSTRACT 
 
Computer networks have become an important dimension of modern 
organizations. Thus, ensuring that networks run at peak performance (network 
utilization and speed running normal without any faults) is considered a crucial step 
for these organizations. To achieve this goal, networks must be secure because 
security is one of the essential issues for reaching a good performance level (no 
faults in the network such as high rate of connection failure). However, this task is 
next to impossible especially when there are other issues that need to be addressed. 
This thesis focuses on detecting the presence of network worms in network, which is 
one of the most challenging problems in network security.  By detecting the presence 
of network worms in the network, resources and services can be further protected by 
patching or installing security ‎measures, such as firewalls, intrusion detection 
systems, or alternative ‎computer systems.  
 
Existing approaches in network worm detection and principally behavior based 
approaches are not sufficiently accurate to perform network worm detection due to 
simple heuristics and inefficient approaches used to detect network symptoms. The 
intention of this thesis is to propose and implement an approach that detects the 
existence of network worms in the network.  
 
 
ii 
 
The proposed approach is known as; A Statistical Approach towards Worm 
Detection using Cross-Relation Technique (ASAWDCRT) consists of three sub-
algorithms, namely. Network scanning, network worm correlation and network 
worm signature automation. Network scanning approach, aims to detect TCP and 
UDP random and ‎sequential scanning, and consists of three sub modules, including 
‎(i) filtering module (ii) traffic statistical analyzer module and (iii) cross ‎relation 
module. Network worm correlation approach, aims to detect the destination source 
‎correlation behavior for network worm and consists of two sub ‎modules, including 
(i) Destination port correlation based network worm ‎detection module and (ii) Alert 
module .‎ Network worm signature automation approach, which aims to generate a 
behavior signature for ‎ network worm symptoms (scanning and destination source 
correlation). 
 
Network scanning algorithm is based on using TCP RST packets for detecting 
TCP sequential scanning and ICMP type 3 (port unreachable) packets for detecting 
UDP sequential scanning. TCP random scanning is confirmed when there is a „cross-
relation‟ between an ICMP type 3, code 1 (host unreachable) and the TCP RST.  
UDP random scanning is confirmed when there is a „cross-relation‟ between an 
ICMP type 3, code 3 (port unreachable) and an ICMP type 3, code 1 (host 
unreachable). 
 
Using ASAWDCRT, significant suppression gain of 94.75% in term of 
accuracy detection for TCP worm detection and 99.9% in term of accuracy detection 
for UDP worm detection as compared to the existing worm detection schemes. 
Meanwhile, scanning algorithm tested with the DARPA 1998 and NAv6 datasets 
iii 
 
and confirmed that scanning algorithm was more effective in detecting TCP and 
UDP scanning than the existing algorithm, and it also provided better detection 
accuracy with average accuracy 66.6%. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Review of Network Worms  
Modern companies and organizations rely heavily on local computers, 
networks, and the internet to deliver and support their main business and operations. 
Thus, maintaining the health and security of the network is of great importance. In 
addition, sharing of network assets and devices makes these networks vulnerable to 
attacks. 
 
Network threats are on the rise. Network worms are dangerous threats due to 
the speed of their propagation. Once a network worm infects a network, it will 
automatically begin to propagate, which will cause great destruction throughout the 
network due to network congestion. This will create unnecessary traffic, which 
serves only network worm propagation.  
 
Ever-growing malware threats (such as network worms) are driving network 
security administrators to investigate solutions that can detect and protect their 
online Web and social media environments. These solutions include blocking 
inbound malware and analyzing outbound traffic to detect compromised endpoint 
systems. 
 
The severity of network worms depends on the propagation process, wherein 
network scanning is initiated to determine the vulnerability of the host and services. 
Network scanning will degrade network performance and consume bandwidth and 
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resource (CPU and memory) by making the network machines busy due to the 
requests that are received and responded in the scanner machine.  
 
1.1 Background 
Network security aims to protect information from interceptions by intruders. 
However, intruders still successfully bypass network security by employing 
malicious codes and techniques. A common example of malicious code is the 
network worm. Network worm is a self-propagated standalone program; it does not 
require other programs for its propagation. The life cycle of a network worm after its 
release typically includes four phases: target finding or scanning, network worm 
transferring, network worm activation, and infection. The network worm is active on 
the network during target finding; network worm transferring and can be detected by 
network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDSs). The activities in the last two 
phases (activation and infection) are limited to local machines and are harder to 
detect by NIDSs because the network worm activities are more focused on 
individual computers rather than on the entire network. In contrast, the activities in 
the first two phases (scanning and transferring) are easier to detect because network 
worm activities are centered on the network, such as the existence of abnormal 
traffic generated from scanning. Figure 1.1 shows the typical location of NIDS in the 
network. 
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Figure 1.1: The typical location of NIDS in the network 
 
1.1.1 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
IDSs are typically used to detect intruder and anomalous activities within 
individual hosts. Network researchers such as Antonatos (2004) defined IDS as the 
process of determining whether the attack was an attack attempt or whether it 
actually took place.  
 
An ID is deployed at the main gateway to monitor network traffic and to check 
the traffic packets against specific rules. These rules were developed to detect 
suspicious packets (such as network worm packets) or anomalous traffic (Chen, 
Cheng & Hsieh, 2009). IDSs are classified into two main categories: signature-based 
and anomaly-based detection systems (Zhou, 2006; Fisk, 2002; and Raghunath, 
2008). 
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1.1.1.1 Signature-based Detection System 
Similar to a computer virus or other malicious codes, a network worm has a 
signature that can be used by IDS in the detection phase. In this type of detection, 
IDS checks the incoming packet payload and system log files against the network 
worm signatures that are already stored in the IDS database. An alert will be 
triggered when a match is found. One advantage of signature-based detection it‟s 
ability to detect known attacks with high accuracy rate. However, signature-based 
detection systems cannot detect zero-day or newly released attacks. In addition, these 
systems must have previously defined network worm signatures for all possible 
attacks, which require frequent network worm signatures updates to keep the 
signature database up-to-date (Patcha & Park, 2007). 
 
1.1.1.2 Anomaly-based Detection System 
A profiling program will be created for the normal behavior of the network, 
which will be used by the anomaly-based detection system as a baseline. Deviation 
from this baseline will be treated as an anomaly or a possible intrusion (Chen et al., 
2010). 
 
The main drawback of the anomaly-based system is the duration of the training 
period spent on profiling the normal traffic behavior of the network. In addition, the 
training process must be repeated if changes occur in the training environment. This 
situation is known as the drift problem, which complicates the creation of a normal 
traffic profile. Figure 1.2 shows the block diagram of a signature (misuse) and 
anomaly detection system. 
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Figure 1.2: Block diagram of a misuse and anomaly detection system (Chen et al., 
2010) 
 
The proposed work is categorized as an anomaly-based detection technique. 
Specifically, it relies on the observation of network traffic to check the existence of 
the network worm based on network worm anomalies.  
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1.1.2 Network Scanning  
Network worms conduct network scanning to determine the vulnerable hosts 
and services of a target network. Network scanning is considered to be the first step 
for attackers to gain access to the targeted network (Leckie & Kotagiri, 2002). This 
process allows unwanted network traffic into the network, which make the scanned 
hosts busy from receiving and responding to various unnecessary requests. Attackers 
are continuously adopting different scanning techniques for this purpose.  
 
The most common scanning techniques are sequential scanning (such as TCP 
or UDP sequential scanning) and random scanning (such as TCP or UDP random 
scanning) (Li et al., 2008). In sequential scanning, the attacker scans a specific and 
known IP or a range of IP addresses sequentially, whereas random scanning enables 
attackers to select their target machines randomly.  
 
Network scanning may exhibit traffic anomalies; because scanners may target 
the whole IP address range looking for hosts and vulnerable services. This is due to 
the fact that attackers are not aware of what services are available and vulnerable 
within the targeted network that they can use to initiate their attacks (De et al. 1999; 
Northcutt & Novak, 2002). TCP and UDP random and sequential scanning are 
commonly used by network worms to find out the vulnerable hosts and services  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Network worms are malicious codes that can propagate through the network 
without human intervention. Network worms are a challenging problem because of 
their highly destructive effects on network resources, topologies and services. The 
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entry point for network worms are the vulnerable hosts and services on the network. 
To locate vulnerable hosts and services, network worms launch a network scan, 
which is the first phase of the life cycle of a network worm. This process is followed 
by the transmission, activation and infection phase (Li et al., 2008). 
 
Network scanning enables an attacker to gather information about his or her 
target, such as the operating systems, system architecture, and services that run on 
each computer. Network scanning is the first step for attackers to gain access to the 
target network. Identifying the information scanned by attackers can assist system 
and network administrators to determine the purpose of the attacks. Thus, resources 
and services can be further protected by patching or installing security measures, 
such as firewalls, IDS, and computer systems. 
 
Several network scanning detection approaches have been proposed in the 
literatures such as anomaly based approach, statistical anomaly based approach and 
aggregation based approach, the best is statistical anomaly based approach 
(Zeidanloo et al., 2010). Examples of this approach are the Statistical Packet 
Anomaly Detection Engine (SPADE) proposed by Staniford et al., (2002) and the 
Statistical Scan Anomaly Detection Engine (SCADE) developed by (Freiling et al., 
2005). However, it still has issues in term of accuracy as discussed in chapter two. 
 
An attacker often blindly scans the network to find vulnerable hosts and 
services. However, they are not aware of the active IPs or the types of services that 
run on each host. Targeting inactive hosts or services will frequently generate 
connection failure messages, such as TCP RST, ICMP 3 code 1, and ICMP 3 code 3 
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packets (host and port unreachable). Frequent connection failures generated by 
network scanning might indicate the existence of a network worm if analyzed 
properly. As a result, several network worm detection techniques based on 
connection failure have been proposed in the literature, such as (Berk et al., 2003), 
(Jung et al., 2004), and (Yang et al., 2006). The basic idea of these approaches is to 
count a certain type of ICMP packet (such as ICMP type 3) within a specific period. 
An alert will be triggered if the number of ICMP packets exceeds the predetermined 
threshold.  
 
In general, approaches that depend on connection failures have high false 
positive detection rates, which are attributed to two main reasons. First, sole 
dependence on connection failure to detect network worms is not sufficiently 
accurate because network worm behaviors exist in addition to connection failure. 
Second, several malicious codes that share the connection failure behaviors of 
network worms lead to misclassification and low detection accuracy. 
 
Anomaly-based approaches have also been proposed for detecting network 
worms and generating the signature of unknown network worms. Among these 
approaches are the AutoGraph (Kim & Karp, 2004), EarlyBird (Singh et al., 2004), 
Anagram (Wang et al., 2006), and LESG (Li et al., 2007). 
 
These approaches examine the content traffic of a network. However, these 
approaches cannot monitor encrypted traffic. Even when network worms are 
transmitted using unencrypted connections, advances in polymorphism research such 
as (Mason et al., 2009) have exposed the premise of these detectors. These 
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approaches generate signatures consisting of a single, contiguous sub-string of a 
network worm‟s payload, which match all network worm instances. Unfortunately, 
these signatures fail to match all polymorphic network worm instances.  
 
As a result, a better solution for network worm detection is needed. Therefore, 
this thesis addresses the following issues: 
1. The existing behavior-based approaches (such as DSC approach) for network 
worm detection with high false positive rates and low detection accuracy are 
examined. The factors that affect the accuracy of the entire system are 
addressed to minimize the rate of false positives.  
2. The existing approaches for generating network worm signatures, which cannot 
sufficiently identify all polymorphic network worms, are investigated. 
 
1.3 Research Objective 
The objectives listed below are intended to solve the problem of low accuracy 
in terms of network worm detection. The main objective of this thesis is to propose a 
new behavioral based algorithm to increase the accuracy of network worm detection. 
The specific objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
 
1. To propose a new statistical algorithm for increasing the accuracy of 
network scanning detection by using the cross-relation technique.  
2. To generate a behavioral signature for network worm symptoms 
[scanning and destination source correlation (DSC)]. 
3. To test and evaluate the proposed behavior based network worm 
detection and compare it with existing behavior based approaches 
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1.4 Research Contribution  
The current behavioral based approaches, which are used to detect the presence 
of network worm in the network, are not accurate in detecting network worm. We 
propose a new algorithm called A Statistical Approach towards Worm Detection 
using Cross-Relation Technique (ASAWDCRT), which is designed to detect 
network worms with improved accuracy and efficiency. If detects the presence of 
network worm in the network in the early stage provide the network administrator 
with the advantage of taking action before the others network machines are 
compromised. High accuracy can be achieved by using advanced approaches to 
detect network worm anomalies that appear in the first two phases of network worm 
life cycle (scanning and network worm transferring).  The detailed contribution of 
the present work as the follow: 
 
The proposed ASAWDCRT provides the following key features: 
a) A new statistical algorithm that increases the accuracy of network 
scanning detection, which is important because network scanning is the first 
step of network worm propagation.  
b) A new behavior-based algorithm for network worm detection. This 
approach uses the proposed scanning approach to detect infected hosts that 
perform scanning. 
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1.5 Research Scope and Limitation  
The research scope is limited to the detection of network worms that propagate 
by employing TCP and UDP sequential and random scanning. The efficiency of the 
proposed scanning approach is decreased when the ‎ICMP error messages are 
blocked or dropped by border routers ‎or gateway systems.‎ 
‎ 
CPU and memory complexity have a linear correlation to the number of 
packets ‎captured and ‎stored in the log table. To circumvent ‎CPU and memory 
saturation, high-end server architecture can be employed to conduct packet capture 
and analysis, while maintaining low time consumption.‎ 
 
The dataset, which is used for testing the behavior-based network worm 
approach, was generated by GTNETS simulator. Behavioral signature automation 
was conducted for TCP and UDP sequential and random scanning and DSC 
behaviors. 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
The proposed algorithm presents A Statistical Approach towards Worm Detection 
using Cross-Relation Technique. This approach is known as ASAWDCRT (Figure 
1.3). 
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Figure 1.3: The Proposed Algorithm 
 
Figure 1.3 shows that ASAWDCRT comprises the following three algorithms:  
1. Network scanning s aims to detect TCP and UDP random and sequential 
scanning, which consists of three sub–modules: (1) filtering module, (2) traffic 
statistical analyzer module, and (3) cross-relation module. 
2. Network worm correlation algorithm detects the Destination Source 
Correlation (DSC) behavior for network worm, which consists of two-sub 
modules: (1) destination port correlation-based network worm detection 
module (DPCBWD), and (2) alert module. 
3. Network worm signature automation algorithm generates a behavior signature 
for network worm symptoms (scanning and DSC behaviors). 
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1.7 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 presents the ‎objectives of 
this thesis, which starts by presenting a background discussion for network worms, 
network scanning and IDS. The research objectives, ‎contributions, scope and 
limitation, and research methodology are also provided in this chapter.‎ 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the most current and related works in behavior-based 
network worm detection, scanning approaches, and signature automation approach. 
The advantages and drawbacks for each approach are highlighted. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology and the design of the proposed solution. 
Statistical “Cross-Relation” Approach for detecting TCP and UDP ‎random and 
sequential Network Scanning (SCANS) ‎ is introduced in this chapter, as well as the 
behavioral signature automation algorithm.‎ 
 
Chapter 4‎ covers the implementation details of ASAWDCRT, database 
structure of ASAWDCRT and capture engine. ‎ 
 
Chapter 5 provides an in-depth analysis and dissuasion for ASAWDCRT 
approach, this ‎chapter is divided into two parts. The first part reports the results of 
accuracy ‎detection for ASAWDCRT. The second part reports the result of 
comparative test ‎between ASAWDCRT and DSC algorithms.‎ 
 
Chapter 6 provides the conclusion and recommendations for future work. ‎ 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter presents background information and applicable research related 
to network worms, network scanning and network worm automation. Section 2.1 
provides a brief introduction to network worm and network worm life cycle. Section 
2.2 relates the network worm transmission schema, while Section 2.3 provides a 
deeper discussion on network worm detection approach. Section 2.4 presents the 
approaches that are used in the network scanning detection. Section 2.5 presents the 
approaches that are used in the network worm‟s signatures automation. 
  
2.1  Network worms 
A network worm is a self-propagating, self-duplicating malicious code that spread 
without human intervention in computer networks and attacks vulnerable hosts and 
services. Network worms are typically classified based on two attributes: methods 
used to spread and the techniques used to exploit vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, 
network worms have destructive effects in the network topology, resources and 
service. Therefore, many researchers attention have been employed to propose 
techniques to detect the presence of network worms in the network (Cohen et al., 
2008). Table 2.1 shows propagation scheme and exploits for different network 
worms. 
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Table 2.1: The propagation scheme for different network worms  
Year Name Exploits Propagation Scheme 
1998 Morris 
Vulnerabilities in 
UNIX Send mail, 
Finger, sh/rexec; 
weak passwords 
The network worm harvests 
hostnames from local files and 
sends object files to a target 
machine. The target then opens a 
connection back to the originator, 
which creates a duplicate process in 
the target machine. 
2001 Code Red 
MS IIS vulnerability 
The network worm sends a 
malicious HTTP payload to a 
randomly generated IP address on 
the TCP port 80. 
2001 Nimda MS IE and IIS 
vulnerabilities 
Nimda sends itself by email or 
copies infected files to the open 
network shares and to vulnerable 
MS IIS Web servers via TFTP on 
the UDP port 69. 
2003 Slammer MS IE and IIS 
vulnerabilities 
The network worm sends a 
malicious UDP packet to a 
randomly generated IP address on 
the port 1434. 
2003 Blaster MS IE and IIS 
vulnerabilities 
The network worm attempts to 
connect to a randomly generated IP 
address on the TCP port 135. 
Successful attack starts a shell on 
port 4444 through which the 
originator 
Instructs the target. The target 
downloads the network worm using 
the originator's TFTP server on the 
port 69 
2004 Witty 
Internet Security 
Systems software 
vulnerability 
The network worm sends a 
malicious UDP packet 
From the source port 40000 to 
randomly generated IP addresses. 
2005 Zotob 
Internet Security 
Systems software 
vulnerability 
The network worm attempts to 
connect to a randomly generated IP 
address on the TCP port 445. 
Successful attack starts a shell on 
port 8888 through which the 
originator instructs the target. The 
target downloads the network worm 
using the originator's FTP server on 
the port 33333. 
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2.1.1 Network Worm Life Cycle  
 
According to Li, Salour & Su (2008) network worms life cycle consist of target 
finding, network worm transferring, network worm activation and infection.  
2.1.1.1 Target Finding (Network Scanning) 
Target finding or network scanning is considered the first step in the network 
worm life cycle, a network worm tries to explore the computer networks to find out 
the vulnerable hosts and services to infect. In this phase, the characteristic behaviors 
for the network worms are obviously appearing and can easily be detected by 
intrusion detection systems (IDS) (Li, Salour, & Su, 2008). Network worm uses 
different   type   of network scanning techniques to find out the victim. The scanning 
techniques are categorized into five categories as shown in Figure 2.1‎. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Scanning techniques methods (Li et al., 2008). 
 
A. Random Scanning ‎ 
In this method, an attacker often blindly scans the network to find out the 
vulnerable host‟s ‎and ‎services. ‎However, he is not aware which IP is active or what 
services are running on ‎each ‎running host. On the other ‎hand, targeting inactive hosts 
or services will frequently ‎generate ‎connection failures messages. Thus frequent 
‎connection failures generated by ‎network scanning ‎might indicate the existence of a 
network worm if it is being ‎analyzed ‎properly (de Vivo et al., ‎1999; Northcutt & 
SCANNING 
TECHNIQUES 
 
Random Sequential Hit list Topological Passive 
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Novak, 2002). The connection failure may occur ‎due to ‎the following: (1) a ‎network 
worm tries to scan some services but the port is closed; in ‎this case the ICMP port is 
‎unreachable or TCP RST packet will be generated (2) a network worm tries ‎to scan 
an inactive host; in ‎this case the ‎ICMP host is also unreachable and a packet will be 
‎generated. Random scanning is common scanning technique employed by network 
worms. This thesis focus on detecting TCP and UDP random scanning  
 
B.‎ Sequential Scanning 
In this method, the attacker aims to scan a block /range of IP addresses 
sequentially. After the ‎network worm has ‎randomly selected a starting IP (s), a 
scanner will continue to scan s+1 (such as 10.207.161.3, s+1=10.207.161.4) or s-
1(such as 10.207.161.3, s-1=10.207.161.2) (Gu, ‎et al., 2004). Sequential ‎scanning 
can be easily noticed by any traffic sniffing tool such as ‎Wireshark. This is because 
the captured IP ‎that is performing the sequential scanning is listed ‎sequentially.‎ This 
thesis focus on detecting TCP and UDP sequential scanning.‎ 
 
C.‎ Hit List Scanning ‎ 
In this method, an attacker defines a list of vulnerable hosts and services to be 
scanned once ‎the ‎network worm is ‎released. This list may be generated by stealthily 
monitoring the network or from ‎somewhere else. The accuracy ‎of this method is 
high since the attacker has prior knowledge ‎about the targets and services. Due to its 
high ‎accuracy, the probabilities of anomaly behavior ‎that ‎may appear is very low, so 
it is difficult for anomaly ‎detection systems to detect such ‎kind of ‎scanning (Chan et 
al., 2006).‎ 
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D.‎ Topological Scanning 
In this method, a network worm based on the local information is saved into 
the hosts. Local ‎information ‎includes email ‎address in user contact list, host file 
(e.g., /etc/hosts) and URLs in ‎the user‟s ‎browsing history.  Attackers will ‎employ 
this information to identify its targets and ‎infection ‎path by using a second channel 
such as the services ‎provided by Google, or by ‎querying a peer-‎to-peer network or an 
instant messaging server for vulnerable peers. ‎Topological network worms can 
‎spread very fast, especially on networks with highly connected ‎applications (Weaver 
et al., 2003).‎ 
E.‎ Passive Scanning ‎ 
In this method, the information about vulnerable hosts and services are 
obtained by ‎monitoring ‎the target ‎network passively (Kato et al., 1999). ‎This form of 
‎scanning is much slower than ‎the previous techniques but can be harder to detect ‎by 
intrusion ‎detection systems (IDS) since it does not ‎appear to show any anomalies 
behavior‎ 
2.1.1.2 Network Worm Propagation Schemes 
As reported by Weaver et al. (2003), there are three network worm propagation 
schemes which are as follows (1) self-carried (2) embedded (3) second channel. Self-
carried network worms are actively transmit itself to the target host (the network 
worms are fully transmitted to the target during the initial connection), second 
channel network worms need second communication channel, in this scheme, the 
network worm communicates with the victim machine using original channel then 
the victim machine connects back to the infecting machine using another channel to 
download the network worm payload. The embedded propagation scheme is very 
stealthy and it‟s done by append the payload after, or replace, legitimate traffic to 
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hide itself. No anomalous events will be triggered, and it is hard for anomaly-based 
detection systems to detect. In addition to the three propagation schemes discussed, 
botnets have been utilized to propagate network worms, spams, spyware, and 
launching distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks (Li et al., 2008). A botnet is a 
group of compromised hosts under the control of a botmaster. The communication 
channel for the botmaster to issue commands that can be implemented using 
different protocols such as http or point-to-point (P2P) protocols.However, the 
majority of botnets use the Internet Relay chat (IRC) protocol for this purpose (Gu et 
al.,2008; Fabian et al., 2007).  
2.1.1.3 Network Worm Activation Schemes 
Network worm activation means running network worms under certain 
condition or schedule. Weaver et al. (2003) classified the network worm activation 
network worm as following:   
1. Human activated,  this type of network worm activation  require human 
intervention to  execute the network worm   
2. The network worm activate based on  specific activity which is performed   by 
user (such as open CD or bin drive) 
3. Activated by a scheduled processes. In scheduled process, network worms are 
activated by a legitimate automated process which has not been properly 
secured, such as a legitimate program which automatically updates itself from 
an infected web server. 
4. Self-activated, this kind of network worm can activate without human 
intervention, and it considers the most dangerous one, this thesis focus on 
detecting this kind of network worms.   
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2.2 Approaches Used in Network worm Detection  
There are many approaches proposed for network worm detection. In the 
following, the commonly used anomaly approaches which are used to detect network 
worms based on an artificial neural network and connection failure approaches. 
 
2.2.1 Artificial Neural Network (ANN) Based Network Worm Detection 
ANN is an information processing paradigm that is inspired by the way 
biological nervous systems (i.e., the brain) are modeled with regard to information 
processing. The key element of this paradigm is the structure of the information 
processing system. It is a network composed of a large number of highly 
interconnected processing elements, called neurons, working together in order to 
approximate a specific function (Moskovitch, Elovici, & Rokach, 2008) 
 
Stopel et al. (2006a) proposed an approach for detecting infected host by 
network worms based on ANN. This approach used the infected host resources such 
as CPU and memory in the network. In addition, the study utilized feature selection 
techniques for the dimension reduction, the used selection techniques are as follow 
(1) The relation between the inputs and the hidden neuron‟s relative variance (2) The 
Fisher score ranking (3) Gain Ratio Filter. The average accuracy for the proposed 
approach was 99.98 %. 
 
The outputs of these techniques are the features that have impact in computer 
behavior which are infected by network worms. The study evaluated each technique 
by preprocessing the dataset accordingly and training the ANN model with the 
preprocessed data. Furthermore, the ability of the model to detect the presence of a 
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new computer network worm was evaluated. In particular, during heavy user activity 
on the infected computer.  
 
Another research proposed by Stopel et al. (2006b) adopted ANN and two 
other known classifications techniques, Decision Tree and k-Nearest Neighbors, to 
observe their ability to classify computer network worms during heavy user activity 
on the infected computers. In this study, a number of computers infected with a 
different number of network worms and different parameters distributed in the 
various measurements such as processor features, TCP layer features, UDP layer 
features, IP layer features and low Network Interface features. Moreover, the study 
evaluated each technique by preprocessing the dataset by training the ANN model 
with the preprocessed data. The average accuracy for the proposed approach was 
85.0 %. 
 
The proposed approach in (Stopel et al., 2006a; Stopel et al., 2006b)  detects 
malicious activity of network worms by looking at the attributes derived from the 
computer operation parameters such as memory usage, CPU usage, and traffic 
activity. The main drawback of this model was appearing in misclassifications of 
network worms in the beginning of their activity. Meanwhile, observing all computer 
features in the network are time and recourse consuming.  
 
Farag et al. (2010) proposed a method for detecting unknown network worms 
based on local victim information. The proposed method initialized an ANN for 
classifying network worm / non-network worm traffic in every host.  The traffic 
classification was performed by using two models which are Classification 
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Prediction Combined model (CPC) and Classification Prediction Separated (CPS) 
model. In CPC the goal was to use ANN to produce two outputs (network worm 
traffic and percentage of infection). In CPS model, two ANN networks were used to 
solve the classification problem. To evaluate the proposed approach, a simulated 
dataset was adopted and the output generated a reliable result with accuracy of 
99.96% in detecting the presence of network worm over the network, even for 
unknown network worms. 
 
The ANN approach has computational advantages when real-time computation 
is needed, and has the potential to detect previously unknown network worms with 
high level accuracy. Also, ANN has advantage to reduce the feature dimensionality. 
However, the two shortcomings for ANN techniques are  
(1) Training period (takes time) and  
(2) Involvement problem (any changes in target environment will affect the training 
dataset). 
 
2.2.2 Connection Failure Based ‎Network Worm Detection ‎ 
The connection failure in the network appears in the form of ICMP Type 3 
(port unreachable), ICMP Type-3 (destination unreachable) and TCP RST packets. 
The existing of these packets in a high rate means that there are many connection 
failures which are considered as very strong footprint and symptom for network 
scanning (first stage in network worm life cycle). An ICMP Type3 code1 (host 
unreachable) packet is generated when TCP/SYN or UDP packet is sent out to an 
unused IP address. Meanwhile, ICMP Type3 code 3 (port unreachable) packets are 
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generated when TCP/SYN or ‎ UDP packet is sent out to an existing address but the 
port closed (Li et al., 2008; Rasheed et al, 2009).  
 
The TCP RST packet is generated in two cases, when a TCP-SYN packet is sent out 
to an existing host but the port is closed, and when a TCP-SYN carries forged source 
IP address that is send to an existing host, the destination host will reply with 
SYN/ACK packet to the real host, in this case, the TCP RST packet is send from a 
real IP address to the destination host as depicted in Figure 2.2 (S. Chen & Ranka, 
2005). 
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Figure 2.2: Connection attempts: a) successful TCP connection b) TCP destination 
port closed c) UDP destination port closed, d) destination IP address does not 
existing. 
 
 Chen & Tabg (2007) analyzed the essential characteristics of TCP based 
network worm propagation that concerned on sending a large number of TCP 
connection requests and developed a Distributed Anti-network worm System (DAW) 
to detect and contain the network worms based on the received failure requests 
through the routers. New defense techniques are developed based on the difference 
between normal hosts and network worm-infected hosts. In fact, a network worm-
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infected host has a notable high connection-failure rate when it randomly scans the 
internet. 
 
This property allows DAW to set the network worms apart from the normal 
hosts. The proposed defense techniques are the temporal rate-limit algorithm and the 
spatial rate-limit algorithm. Temporal rate-limit algorithm is designed to constraint 
the maximum number of failed requests daily (constraints done by determining the 
normal number of connection failure). On the other hand, spatial rate-limit algorithm 
constrains the combined scanning rate of all infected hosts in the network. The 
purpose of this approach is to slow down or even halts the network worm 
propagation within Internet service provider (ISP). The drawbacks of DAW are  as 
follow (1) unable to detect network worm using UDP transmission schema  (Li et al., 
2008)  such as slammer (Moore et al., 2003) (2) unable to detect low rate scanning 
network worm (Rasheed, Norwawi, Ghazali, & Kadhum, 2009). The effectiveness of 
the new techniques is evaluated analytically by simulation.  Figure 2.3 shows the 
DAW architecture. 
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Figure 2.3: DAW architecture (S Chen & Tang, 2007). 
